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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan has 4.2 million ha covered by forests, which is equivalent to 4.8 
percent of the total land area. Most of these forests are found in the northern part 
of the country (40 percent in the North West Frontier Province, 15.7 percent in 
the Northern Areas, and 6.5 percent in the AJK). This study will focus on the 
natural hill forests found in the northern region of Pakistan, particularly the 
North Western Frontier Province (NWFP).1 
The total forest cover (4.8 percent) is low when compared with other parts 
of the world, 27 percent for the developed countries and 26 percent for the 
developing countries. Per capita forest cover presents a gloomier picture. 
Pakistan has only 0.03 ha of forest per capita while corresponding figures for the 
developed and the developing countries are 1.07 and 0.50 respectively.2 With a 
population growth rate of 2.6 percent, forest per capita is declining in Pakistan. 
These forests are not enough to meet the nation’s demand of wood and 
wood based products. In 1998, the wood consumption in Pakistan was 33,018 
thousand cubic metres. Total wood produced was only 350 thousand cubic 
metres [Pakistan (1998)]. This resource scarcity puts a burden on the foreign 
exchequer. In 1998-99, Pakistan imported Rs 8499.3 million worth of wood and 
wood products [Paksitan (2000)]. Its total exports of wood and wood products 
stood at mere Rs 381.4 million. 
Pakistan has faced significantly high rates of deforestation in the past.3 
According to one estimate [WRI and IIED (1988)], the forest area of Pakistan 
decreased from 141530 square km in 1880 to 67310 in 1980; a decrease of 52 
percent in one hundred years. During the 1970’s, the study estimates an annual 
decrease of 1.5  percent per year [Vin Dijk and Hussein (1994)]. Estimates of 
contemporary deforestation are varied. Pakistan (1992c) reported that some 
7000-9000 ha of forests were lost each year. Khattak (1994) puts this estimate at 
10,000 ha annually. Since these reports came out in early nineties, these 
estimates cannot be held true for the nineties. FAO (1998) provides the most 
recent estimate of annual deforestation. It reported that between 1990-95 
Pakistan experienced deforestation at a rate of 1.1 percent (55000 ha) annually.4 
This presents a rather grim picture for the future prospects of the sector. In fact, 
                                                          
1The forests of NWFP are distributed over the Himalayas in the Hazara Civil Division, and 
the Hindu Kush in the Malakand Civil Division. 
2Forest cover estimate for Pakistan is taken from Forestry Sector Master Plan (1992). 
Figures for the developed and for developing countries are taken from FAO (1995). 
3Estimates of deforestation rates are very sketchy. In most cases these are mere 
guesstimates. 
4This, however, should be taken with a grain of salt since this period corresponds with 
timber ban, which was imposed in 1992. 
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doubts have been raised that if nothing is done to check this process the 
remaining forests will soon disappear [Knudsen (1996) and Khattak (1994)]. 
This prompts one to study the Institutions of property governing the use of forest 
resources, the purpose of which is to safeguard resources from overexploitation. 
Property institutions and their role in shaping resource use patterns has only 
recently begun to be studied. The manner in which people use environmental 
resources depends on the property rights governing those resources [Tietenberg 
(1994), p. 31]. It is argued that since human beings interact with their environment 
through institutions of property, and since much of the environmental deterioration is 
attributed to human activities, roots of environmental problems are to be traced to 
inadequate and ill-defined property institutions [Hanna and Munasinghe (1995)].5  
These property institutions are a part of over all institutions of a society 
[North (1990)]. Institutions are a set of rules that govern and constrain human 
interaction.6 The role of institutions in determining economic performance has 
been widely studied.7 Since institutions define the framework within which 
human interactions take place, and hence structure human behaviour, our 
environment, and more specifically, the resource use pattern is influenced by it. 
We develop these arguments further to construct our conceptual framework, 
which is the next section of this study. In third section we use this framework to 
analyse institutional set up for forest management in Pakistan. The fourth section 
concludes this analysis. The fifth section gives policy recommendations. 
 
II. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The first part of this section discusses institutions. This is a general 
discussion. The purpose is to get useful insights into the nature of institutions. 
From there we move on to discuss Property institutions and related concepts. 
Property is defined as a relation among individuals, which arise from the 
existence of goods.8 This makes the second part of this section. We then describe 
forests as common pool resources. In the last part of the section we draw upon 
our previous discussion to come up with a set of minimum basic conditions that 
are important for an optimal utilisation of the resource. This will make our 
conceptual framework. 
                                                          
5Hanna and Munasinghe write that most of the environmental problems can be seen as 
problems of “incomplete, inconsistent, or unenforced property rights regimes” [Hanna and Munasinghe 
(1995), p. 15]. 
6This definition of institutions is adopted from North (1990).  
7This concept is explored by the NIE School of Thought. According to this school of 
thought institutions are important in determining the economic outcomes because they, together 
with other economic constraints, define the opportunity (or choice) set of individuals. [See Harris et 
al. (1995); North (1990, 1991); Ostrom (1990); Eggertsson (1990)]. 
8Pejovich (1990). See below for further elaboration of the concept. 
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Defining Institutions and Their Components 
The idea that institutions are important in the functioning of an economy 
is not new. The New Institutional Economics (NIE) school of thought has made 
considerable advances on this account, and has earned itself a prominent position 
in the realm of economics.9 The main postulate of NIE is that institutions, broadly 
defined to means rules and constraints that provide a framework for human 
interaction affect economic outcomes.  
North (1990) defines institutions as humanly devised constraints that 
shape and guide human interactions. They reduce uncertainty in everyday life by 
providing a structure to human interaction and behaviour [North (1990), p. 3]. 
Institutions include any kind of constraints/rules that human beings devise to 
shape interactions: both formal and informal.  
Formal constraints are the rules devised by human beings to facilitate 
exchange. These include political (and judicial) rules, economic rules and 
contracts. Of our interest here are the economic rules, which define property 
rights. Property right is the right to use, earn income from and alienate a resource 
[Barzel (1989)].  
Informal constraints are the norms, convention, and code of ethics that 
societies evolve over time. These constraints are more pervasive than formal 
rules [North (1990), p. 36]. These informal constraints are socially transmitted 
information and are a part of the culture. They do not change immediately in 
reaction to changes in the formal rules. The resultant tension between changed 
formal rules and the persisting informal rules has implications for the economic 
outcomes (ibid: 37). 
A rule serves no purpose if it cannot be enforced, so enforcement 
mechanism is an integral part of any institution. Rules are not always self-
enforcing, and hence their enforcement cannot be taken for granted. Enforcement 
is not a problem when exchange parties gain from cooperating. It becomes a 
problem when benefits from shirking become quite substantial. “There are two 
reasons why enforcement can be imperfect. The first is the cost of measuring the 
multiple margins that constitute performance. The second rests in the fact that 
enforcement is undertaken by the agents whose own utility functions influence 
outcomes” [North (1990), p. 54]. 
Enforcement mechanism requires (1) ways to ensure that rules are 
observed, and (2) sanctions against violations. The costliness of ascertaining 
violations and the severity of punishment are considered to be an essential part 
of the functioning of institutions (ibid: 4). North argues that ultimately those 
institutions are required that can use threat of coercion to enforce agreements, 
and the state is the only authority that can exercise this threat of coercion. 
                                                          
9See Nubli and Nugent (1989) for a review of literature on New Institutional Economics. 
Also see Harriss, Hunter and Lewis (eds) (1995). 
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Rawls defines institutions as a “public system of rules that specify certain 
actions as permissible, other as forbidden, and provide for certain penalties and 
defences when violation occur” [Runge (1984), p. 807]. Basically, institutions 
provide a set of constraints which govern behavioural relations among 
individuals and groups [Nabli and Nugent (1989), p. 1335]. We focus upon this 
theme in our discussion. 
Institutions perform a coordinating function in the society. Rules define 
what individuals are allowed to do and what they can expect from fellow human 
beings. Even though they may at times produce conflicts, rules “reduce the 
chances for conflict because they reduce the total amount of ambiguity for those 
concerned by defining specific rather than universalic claims and obligations. It 
becomes possible to order one’s life with a set of priority regarded as legitimate 
[Colson (1974) and North (1990), p. 38].  
According to North the major function of institutions in a society is to 
reduce uncertainty by giving a stable structure to human interaction. Uncertainty 
comes from incomplete information about the behaviour of other individuals in 
the process of human interaction. Even if complete information was available, 
individuals have limited mental capacity to process, organise and utilise 
information-bounded rationality. This bounded rationality, combined with 
uncertainty in deciphering the environment, imply the need to develop the 
regularised pattern of human interactions and results in evolution of rules and 
procedures that simplify the process. 
Institutions facilitate exchange by reducing costs of transaction. 
Transaction costs consist of cost of measurement, the cost of measuring the 
valuable attributes of what is being exchanged,10 and the cost of enforcement, the 
cost of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements.11 North (1990) 
argues, “these measurement and enforcement cost are the sources of social, 
political and economic institutions” [North (1990), p. 27]. 
Runge (1984) argues “institutions channel the behaviour of people with 
respect to each other and their belongings, providing assurance by setting the rules 
of the game. They increase the value of a stream of benefits associated with 
economic activity by coordinating behaviour” Institutions perform the function of 
reducing uncertainty of users by defining and stabilising their expectations. It is 
necessary to make one qualification to this statement. Institutions are not always 
growth enhancing. They have the potential to increase output from economic 
                                                          
10Commodities, services and performance of individuals have many attributes and their 
level vary from one specimen to another. The measurement of these levels is too costly to be 
comprehensive or fully accurate. The information cost in ascertaining the level of attribute yields 
measurement costs. 
11Enforcement cost arises from incomplete information. Because we do not know the 
attributes of a good or service or all characteristics of the performance of an agent we have to devote 
costly resources to try to measure and monitor them. 
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activity, i.e., if appropriate rules are devised and enforced. In most third world 
countries institutions are not efficient. They are not even meant to be efficient. 
Rather “they are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to 
devise new rules” [North (1990), p. 16]. With this we conclude our discussion on 
institutions. Later, these concepts will be used to develop the analytical framework. 
So far we have talked about institutions in general and since property 
institutions are a subset of over all institutions much of what had been said so far 
applies to them. Still we have to dig deep into the concept to see what does the 
concept of property really entail, and what important consideration have to be 
kept in mind in setting up a proper institutional set up. 
 
Property—Theoretical Considerations 
Property is a relation that defines an individual vis-à-vis all other 
individuals with relation to an object [Pejovich (1990)]. In legal talks, property 
is not things but rights, rights in or to things [Macpherson (1978), p. 2]. 
An important point to notice is the distinction between property and a 
mere physical possession of an object. Green (1885) explains that “property not 
only implies a permanent possession of something, or a possession that can be 
given up with the good will of the possessor, but also a possession recognised as 
a right” [Macpherson (1978), p. 103]. The concept that we want to emphasise 
here is that of social recognition and acceptance. Macpherson (1978) goes 
further in explaining the concept, for him “to have a property is to have a right in 
the sense of an enforceable claim to some use or benefits of something ...a claim 
that will be enforced by the society or the state, by custom or convention or law” 
[Macpherson (1978), p. 3]. So, property is not just a claim, it is a claim that is 
accepted and endorsed by the society at large. 
The concept of enforceability needs some elaboration. Defining property 
as an enforceable claim implies that there be someone to enforce it, the only 
body that is extensive enough to do that is the society itself, or its specialised 
organisation- the state [Macpherson (1978), p. 4]. Enforceability does not imply 
that the right rests on nothing but a threat of force. On the contrary, “the threat of 
force is invoked only as an instrument that is thought to be necessary to 
guarantee a right”(ibid. p. 3). The social recognition of the claim is very 
important. 
 
Property System 
Property system is a system of rules governing access to and control over 
resources [Waldron (1988), p. 38]. Property systems are central to an economic 
system as they solve problem of allocation of resources. Bromley defines 
property institutions are public system of rule specifying permissible and forbidden 
actions in relation to ownership, use rights, responsibilities and obligations of 
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individuals and groups [Runge (1984), p. 807]. Property rights are relations 
among individuals that arise from the existence of scarce goods and pertain to 
their use. They specify the norms of behaviour with respect to economic goods 
that all person must observe in their interaction with other people or bear the 
penalty cost of non-observance [Pejovich (1990)].  
Honore (1961) has elucidated some common features, which he calls ‘the 
standard incidents’, of the concept of ownership.12 He suggests that “the owner 
of an object X will have (1) a right to the possession of X; (2) a right to use X; 
(3) a right to manage X; (4) a right to income that can be derived by permitting 
others to use X; (5) a right to the capital value of X; (6) a right to security against 
the expropriation of X; (7) a power to transmit X by sale, gift or bequest; (8) the 
lack of any term on the possession of any of these rights; (9) a duty to refrain 
from using X in a way that harms others; (10) a liability that certain judgments 
against him may be executed on X” [Waldron (1988, p. 49)]. It is this bundle of 
rights, duties and liabilities that constitute a structure of ownership.13 
 
Economic Approach to Property 
Economics is about making the best possible use of scarce resources. Since 
property rights determine the conditions of access to and control of these scarce 
resources, a set of particular property right has impact on the economic 
performance of the economy. This point is advocated by the so-called ‘Property 
Rights School’. They stress that a well-defined structure of property rights induces 
efficiency in the use of resources.14 Before we define what is exactly meant by 
‘well defined structure’, we give how property is conceived by economists. 
Economists’ definition of the term property differs slightly from a legal 
definition. For them, property is a claim to a stream of benefits coming from a 
resource. Resources are something that offers benefits to human beings. Reeve 
(1986) describes resources as objects of want: something people wish for 
because it provides satisfaction, either direct or indirect, to them. An object 
becomes a resource when people develop ability to command that benefit stream 
[Dani, Gibbs, and Bromley (1987), p. 14].  
What are the features of a well-defined property rights structure? Posner 
(1973) identifies three characteristics of an efficient set of property rights: “it is 
                                                          
12They are not the ‘essential features’ of each and every society; rather they may be present 
in different societies in different combinations such that some features may be more prominent in 
one society than in the others, some may even be missing in a society. 
13The concept of ownership is usually meant to denote exclusive (private) ownership. 
Exclusive ownership implies the right to exclude non-owners.  
14Demsetz (1967) is one of the pioneering works on this field. Other prominent supporters 
of this view include Posner (1973); Pejovich (1990); Tidsell (1992); Tietenberg (1992, 1994). 
Posner (1973) argues that the function of property rights is to create a structure of incentives to use 
resources efficiently [Reeve (1986), p.  23]. 
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universal, in the sense that all resources are either owned, or capable of being 
owned, by someone; it is exclusive, in the sense that other persons may be 
excluded from enjoyment of the object of the property right; and the property 
rights are themselves transferable” [Reeve (1986), p.  24]. 
Why would this structure induce efficiency? The argument goes as 
follows: The first condition of universality implies that all things should be 
owned. Ownership creates interest in the thing owned. In fact Honore (1961) 
defines ownership as “the greatest possible interest15 in a thing which a mature 
system of law recognises” [Reeve (1986), p. 18]. What is this interest? Nozick 
states that the rules of property determine for each object which individuals are 
entitles to realise which of the constrained set of options socially available with 
respect to that object [c.f. Waldron (1988), p. 32]. So if an object yields benefits 
then the owner of the object is entitled to receive those benefits. In other words, 
property rights channel benefits associated with an object to the right holder and 
this creates an interest. 
The second condition is of exclusivity. Put simply, exclusivity implies 
exclusive ownership and a right to exclude non-owners. Pejovich (1990) 
explains that the exclusivity of ownership means that the owner has the right to 
choose what to do with his asset, how to use it, and who is to be given access to 
it. He has a right to exclude non-owners from exercising any of these rights. The 
exclusivity creates a link between one’s right to choose how to use the asset and 
bearing the consequences of that choice. Since the owner of the asset is the only 
person who will receive benefits from that decision, he will have an incentive to 
put his asset to the highest value use. 
This brings in the basic argument of the economic approach to property 
rights which is that the costs and benefits of a person’s activities should rebound 
on him, and only on him. Inefficiencies in resource use occur when a person, a 
decision maker, does not bear the entire consequences of his action. This 
situation is depicted as one involving externality.16 Demsetz (1967) argues that a 
well-defined structure of property rights will increase efficiency in resource use 
by internalising these externalities. Property rights should be structured such that 
the harmful or beneficial effects of a person’s activities are brought to bear on 
him rather than on other persons [Reeve (1986), p. 26].  
                                                          
15The greatest possible interest is used to denote that ownership is not absolute; it is 
constrained by social restrictions. Honore uses the example of umbrella to make his point, an owner 
of an umbrella may use it for his convenience but he cannot use it to poke other people with it. The 
ownership rights of the umbrella owner are not unlimited. 
16 “Externality exists when the welfare of some agent A depends directly on his activities 
and on activities under the control of some other agent B” [Tietenberg (1992), p. 52)]. The agent B 
does not bear the entire cost (negative externality) or reap the entire benefit (positive externality) of 
the action. In the case of negative externality, private cost (of the action) to the agent B will be less 
than the social cost (cost to the society) and economic activity, e.g., production will take place at 
level greater than optimum. In the case of positive externality, good will be under supplied. 
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Transferability is another condition. It means that the owner has the right 
to transfer all or part of his rights to another person in a mutually agreed upon 
exchange. Transferability provides incentive to move resources from less 
productive to more productive opportunities [Pejovich (1990), p. 29]. 
Tietenberg (1992) lists one more condition- enforceability, and quite 
rightly so. Enforceability means security from involuntary seizure or 
encroachment by others. What Honore (1961) calls a right to security against the 
expropriation of the asset. Reeve (1986) discusses that interest in a resource is 
conceptually linked to the means available to protect it. A claim to a resource is 
taken to be good against and legally guaranteed against any rival claims. 
Protection may be conceived in two ways- de facto and de jure; de jure 
protection refers to written laws and de facto refers to actual practice of it. 
Protection also involves consideration of penalties. The size of penalty 
determines the degree of protection that the property enjoys. 
Together these four conditions determine an efficient structure of property 
rights. It is argued that the only system that carries these characteristics is the 
system of private property.  
 
Forests as Common Pool Resources 
Technically speaking, natural forests share their attributes with 
Common Pool Resources. Ostrom and Gardner (1993) define Common Pool 
Resources as natural or man made resources where exclusion is difficult and 
yield is subtractable. As such they share their first attribute with pure public 
goods and the second attribute with pure private good. The first attribute, 
difficulty of exclusion, results from factors such as cost of parcelling and 
fencing the resource and the cost of designing and enforcing property rights to 
exclude access to the resource. It is this attribute of CPR that makes them 
prone to free riding by others. The second attribute of subtractability means 
that resource unit that one person appropriates from the resource is not 
available to others [Ostrom and Gardner (1993), p. 93]. These two attributes 
collectively make common pool resources vulnerable to extinction, thus 
highlighting the need to regulate the behaviour of its users.17 Rules have to be 
set for a sustainable level of exploitation of the resource; some kind of 
enforcement mechanism is needed as well. This function is provided by the 
resource regime.18   
 
                                                          
17The notion of resource management stems from their scarcity, if they were in unlimited 
supply the need may not have arisen. This applies to all resources and not just common pool resource. 
18A resource regime is a structure of rights and duties characterizing the relationship of 
individuals to one another with respect to that particular resource [Bromley and Cernea (1989), p. 5]. 
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Basic Conditions for a Proper Institutional Set-up 
Macpherson (1978) writes that institutions are man made, and are created 
with some objective.19 We make a qualification to this statement and say that 
although institutions evolve over time, and hence cannot be described results of 
human action; formal rules still are a result of purposive human actions. So we 
make amendment to the above statement and say that formal rules are man made 
are made with some objective in mind. These objectives determine the shape of 
the institution.  
We draw a logical implication from this that if some objective is set, and 
a rule is made accordingly, then proper institutional arrangements must also be 
made to ensure that the rule is observed, which should eventually help secure the 
objective. In this part we will explore this point. To put it clear, if the 
government has outlined an objective for the forestry sector than it must also 
establish an appropriate institutional set up to achieve that objective. We will 
make a normative criterion, elaborating the conditions that we think are 
necessary, for this we draw upon the discussion so far. Before that we summarise 
what has been said so far. 
In the first part of the chapter we talked about institutions. Institutions 
were defined as rules and constraints that shape human behaviour; as such they 
provide structure to human interaction. We argued for the “New Institutional” 
point of view that institutions have an important implication for economic 
performance.  This is so because they have the potential20 to increase the flow of 
benefits from economic activity. 
We talked about the important feature of institutions, relying mainly on 
the work of North (1990). Using his theory we said that the function of 
institutions is to coordinate behaviour. As Runge (1984) said, institutions set 
rules of the game so that each individual knows what actions he is allowed to 
take and what not, what he is expected to do and what he can expect from other 
fellow beings. To a large extent these rules should eliminate conflict of interest. 
We elaborated on the idea that rules not only include formal rules but also 
informal rules. Formal rules are the result of decision taken by human beings. 
Informal rules are codes of conduct that evolve over time. They are more 
pervasive and immune to abrupt changes. As a result, they play an important role 
in structuring interaction. North (1990) argues that ideally formal rules should be 
devised so as to make the informal rules more effective. 
                                                          
19“Institution is man-made, it is assumed to have been made, and to be kept up, for some purpose: 
either to serve some supposed essentially human needs, which would determine what the institution is; or to 
meet the wants of the classes which have made it what it is” [Macpherson (1978), p. 1]. 
20We use the word potential because all institutions are not growth enhancing. The relation 
between institutions and economic performance is not unique. Institutions can retard performance if 
they do not function properly. 
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A rule serves no purpose if it cannot be enforced. Enforcement can come 
from two sides: (1) voluntary acceptance, and (2) enforcement by an external 
authority, either society or the state. In the case of voluntary acceptance 
enforcement poses little or no problem. In the second case it may be a problem, 
or it may not. Enforcement will not be a problem if the rule earns social 
acceptance, but if does not then enforcement can be difficult and costly. North 
(1990) suggests that rules should be devised with compliance cost in mind. 
Enforcement has two components: (1) ways to ascertain that violation has 
occurred; (2) sanctions and punishment against that. Effective enforcement 
requires both, a mechanism to detect violation, and proper sanction to deter 
anyone from violating the rule. These rules and constraints and enforcement are 
the essential feature of institutions.  
If the state sets some policy objectives for itself, then it must ensure that a 
proper Institutional set up is in place to accomplish those objectives. In other 
words, rules that are devised must structure human behaviour such that the 
objective is secured. These rules must be enforceable. We can put these 
conditions as following: 
 1. Appropriate rules are devised; appropriate in the sense that if they are 
respected, they will secure the objective. These rules must be 
appropriate from the point of view of social set up as well. That is, 
formal and informal constraints must not stand in contrast to each other. 
This is important because eventually the purpose of institutions is to 
coordinate behaviour, and this second condition is necessary to secure 
that. 
 2. Rules and constraints are enforceable; enforcement has two 
components; (1) voluntary enforcement, i.e., individual accepts the rule 
as morally right and observes it, (2) enforcement by an external agency 
which includes (a) social acceptance, i.e., society as a whole accepts the 
rule and then uses social pressure to make individuals observe, and (b) 
enforcement by law, where threat of law (or coercive force) is used to 
enforce the rule. This still does not mean exercise of this force in the 
real sense of the word; just the threat that in case rule is not observed 
some legal action will be taken. 
 3. Proper enforcement mechanism exists, both de jure and de facto; it 
must include,  
 • A mechanism to detect that violation of the rule; 
 • Penalties against violations. These should be sufficient enough to 
discourage violations; 
 • A mechanism to impose penalties. 
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This enforcement mechanism is necessary to minimise chances of 
violations. A simple threat of law will not work if people know that they may not 
be found breaking the rule, so first condition is necessary for this reason. Second 
condition is also important because if penalties are small, they may not deter 
people if benefits of their actions outweigh this cost. 
In the discussion on property, it was defined as an enforceable claim. It is 
not mere physical possession, neither just a claim, it is a claim that is accepted 
and acknowledged by the society. It was said that enforceability does not imply 
that the right rests on nothing but a threat of force. On the contrary, “the threat of 
force is invoked only as an instrument that is thought to be necessary to 
guarantee a right” [Macpherson (1978), p. 3]. The social recognition of the claim 
is very important. We talked about a ‘well defined’ property right structure, and 
that this structure ensures efficiency. We also said that whatever the objective, 
property rights must be structured accordingly. 
“Essential for any property regime is an authority system able to ensure 
that the expectations of rights holders are met. Compliance, protected and 
reinforced by an authority system, is a necessary condition for the viability of a 
property regime” [Bromley and Cernea (1989), p. 17]. 
Lastly, we talked about common pool resources and that they are 
characterised by difficulty of exclusion, since problems of exclusion are directly 
related to the problems of protection, a system of protection is very important for 
these types of resources. With this in mind we turn attention to the present case 
and see what are the objectives and whether appropriate rules exist. 
The primary objective of all forest policies has been to use forests for the 
well being of people. This has more to do with the political ideology. For more 
practical purposes two objectives can be identified: 
 1. Conserve and protect the forests. This is more primitive than other 
objective, dating back to the middle of eighteenth century when the 
British first took control of the forests; 
 2. Use it pragmatically to meet wood demands of the nation.  
Natural forests serve two important purposes: they serve the important 
function of protecting the watersheds, and as such they have large positive 
externality; and they are a prime source of timber. The government has outlined 
following objectives for these forests: 
 (a) Manage them for the protective service they provide; 
 (b) Use them to meet timber requirements without harming the resource. 
The two objectives can be compatible only if the forest resource is used 
and managed in such a way that the flow of benefits from them is maximised, in 
other words they are used as efficiently as possible. What conditions are then 
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necessary to achieve that? We draw upon the previous discussion. We have said 
that if the objective is to maximise the flow of benefit from an economic activity 
then it is essential that the institutions are efficient. Our discussion about 
property has established that to use resources efficiently, a well-defined structure 
of property rights must be present. From this discussion and from the objectives 
given above we must identify a structure that serves both objectives 
simultaneously. We elaborate on it now. 
 (1) The first important condition is that forests are owned. We have said 
that ownership creates an interest in the resource. In the case of private 
ownership this interest is personal because the owner can then receive 
the benefits. In the case of state ownership the state has to look after 
the welfare of the community/people. 
 (2) This is related to the first condition, it is important point that the 
ownership be socially accepted as morally right. Formal property right 
is compatible with the informal property rights, and there is no conflict 
of interest as a result of this property rule. 
 (3) Ownership is exclusive. The owner has the right to make decision 
about the resource and can exclude others from this process. The 
decision involves how to use the resource, how to manage it, and 
whom to give access to it. With regards to these latter points, it is 
important that: 
 (a) Management system supports both objectives; that is of 
sustainability, and of protective service; 
 (b) It must internalise the externality. In case of positive externality 
the good is under supplied; if forests exert a large positive 
externality in terms of providing a protective service then the 
property right structure must internalise this externality. 
 (c) Forests are considered to be for the benefit of people, so a system 
of ownership must be accompanied by a system of accountability 
ensuring that forests are being managed for the best interest of the 
people.21  
 (4) A proper enforcement mechanism for the protection of forests. It was 
said before that common pool resources are characterised by difficulty 
of exclusion, and this makes their protection against illegal seizure a 
problem. Therefore an enforcement mechanism is necessary. We 
earlier said that this must have two components; 
 (a) A system of communication to detect that a crime has been 
committed; 
                                                          
21Often called ‘collective interest’. 
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 (b) A system to impose penalties; 
 (c) Penalties should outweigh benefits from the crime. 
 
III.  FOREST MANAGEMENT IN PAKISTAN 
 In the previous section we developed a framework identifying basic 
conditions that should be present if government intends to achieve its policy 
objectives. In this section we use that framework to analyse current resource 
regime. For that purpose we group those basic conditions   under three main 
headings; (1) ownership structure; (2) Enforcement mechanism; (3) management 
system. 
 
Ownership Structure 
 In Pakistan, forests are held under a variety of ownership arrangements. 
According to legal classification, forests are divided between public forests 
(state-owned) and private forests (non-state). These are further divided into sub-
categories. The main categories of public forests are reserved, and protected. 
While guzara forests constitute the main part of private forests.22 In NWFP, 
reserved forests (97.9 million ha) and guzara forests (48.4 million ha) are found 
in the Hazara division. Protected forests (57.7 million ha) are mostly situated in 
Malakand division.23  
Reserved forest is the strictest tenure class in which locals have no rights.  
The right of passage, water, and grazing are allowed as concessions with 
government approval. In the protected forest, in addition to these rights, locals 
are allowed fuelwood collection and timber for their personal needs. They also 
have 60-80 percent share in the sale proceeds. Guzara forests are private forests 
held either individually (by families), or jointly (by communities). But these 
forests are managed by the forest department, except for a short period of time 
(1981–1992) when they were managed by forest cooperative societies. 
 
Evolution of Property Rights 
This section traces the evolution of property rights in forests. The 
documented forest history of the subcontinent dates back to the middle of the 
nineteenth century, about the same time when British advent of India occurred. 
Not much is known about the pre-colonial pattern of land ownership, except that 
it was predominantly communal. Singh (1986) estimates at least 80 percent of 
the total natural resources of India were under some kind of common property. 
                                                          
22Azhar (1993) labels them as regulated commons. Most of these forests are held jointly by 
group, but managed by the government except for a short period of time (1981–1992) when these 
forests were managed by forest cooperative societies. 
23Area estimates are taken from Annual Development Statistics NWFP (1999), p. 180. 
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Forests, being no exception, were mostly held as common property by those 
living close to them [Azhar (1993); Gadgil and Guha (1995); Guha (1993, 
1989); Singh (1986)]. 
Generally, the idea of private property, and as such of private (exclusive) 
property rights to forests was alien to the local population. Forests were freely 
available to the locals for use. It does not however imply that they were open 
access resources. There were customary rights on those forests, in some 
instances they were recorded (in the wajab-ul-arz; a document maintaining 
records of the entitlement of individual village households). In most instances, 
locals were not owners of the resources; rather, they had usufructus rights.24 The 
right of ownership lied with the local rulers, but they never intervened in the 
exercise of the usufructus rights by the local inhabitants [Azhar (1993); Mumtaz 
and Nayab (1992); Cernea (1990);  Singh (1986)]. Literature also reveals that 
these resources were used for subsistence living, and commercial exploitation 
was an absent phenomenon in those days [Guha (1993); Singh (1986)]. 
After colonisation of the sub-continent, around the middle of the 
eighteenth century, British started with their land settlement process. The state 
extended its control over forests through the Indian Forest Act of 1878, and as 
such nationalised one fifth of India’s land area. It enacted legislation ‘regulating 
peasant access by restricting it to areas of forests not deemed commercially 
profitable’ [Guha (1993), p. 85]. Under this legislation, punitive sanctions were 
introduced against transgressors, and a forest department was set up to police the 
forests in addition to regulating tree felling in the areas brought under 
government supervision” [Banuri and Marglin (1993), p. 30].  
The most well stocked forests (commercially profitable) were declared as 
reserved forests, and those that were not well stocked were left for the local 
population to meet their requirements, these were labelled wastelands.25 So 
initially, the task resulted in the division of forests in two categories: the reserved 
forests and wastelands/guzara Forests. The reserved forests were almost free of 
rights of locals. The rights of passage, water use and grazing and fuelwood 
collection were allowed as a concession. In the guzara forests, in addition to 
above stated rights, local people were allowed to make use of the forest for 
liquidation of debts and the education of their children; moreover they could 
exploit the forests for commercial purposes on payment of a small fee to the 
government.26  
                                                          
24What Singh (1986) describes as occupancy rights. 
25In some areas the wastelands were later labelled Guzara forests. 
26This account of customary rights is taken from Azhar (1990). Also see The West Pakistan 
Forest Manual, Volume 1, Legislation Relating to Forest Administration with Rules made under 
Forest Acts and Regulations (1963). 
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The arrangement posed problem; it provoked local people because it had 
caused infringement of their customary rights.27 Locals could no more exercise 
their rights with same freedom. In the case of reserved forests the infringement 
was severe, as they could not cut trees any more. For guzara forests they had to 
seek permission from the government for the exercise of same rights. 
 
Demarcation of Forests 
The next step in the establishment of state’s control over forests was a 
demarcation between reserved and guzara forests. Since the purpose of state 
control of the forests was to safeguard state forests from misuse by the local 
population, therefore, a proper demarcation was essential in restricting people’s 
access, defining boundaries beyond which local users (and others) could not go. 
This, however, could not be accomplished with ease. In fact government’s 
attempts at demarcation were met with protest from the local community as they 
contested the rights of the government,28 and struggled to assert their rights over 
forestland. Consequently the government failed to demarcate reserved forests 
[Azhar (1993)]. 
The government could only accomplish the task by leaving the disputed 
areas out of the reserve category. It had to constitute another category of forests 
to accommodate these disputed area, labelled protected forests.29 It was decided 
that demarcation would only occur when nature and extent of rights were 
thoroughly investigated. 
In the protected forests locals were given more rights. In addition to the 
concession they enjoyed in the reserve forests, the locals had rights to cut timber 
for their non-commercial needs, subject to prior governmental approval. The 
government itself retained the rights to trees of spontaneous growth, and carried 
out large felling operations during this period for the building of local 
cantonment and the northwest railways [Azhar (1993)]. Such felling in turn 
fuelled resentment among the right holders because they considered this as an 
infringement of their rights.  
Literature also reveals that Government efforts at demarcation were only 
half-hearted. Jan (1965) observes that “boundaries pillars ... ultimately 
                                                          
27Guha (1993) writes that “the abrupt extension of state control sharply conflicted with the 
customary use of the forest by the local population” and led to protests by the locals [Guha (1993), 
p. 83-86] 
28Traditional usufructus rights of these forests lied with the communities, and were 
recorded in some cases. 
29Government. Of West Pakistan in one of its report—The Report of the Murree Hills High 
Powered Commission; Lahore: Government Of West Pakistan, 1958—writes that the protected 
forest category was constituted because “it was a quicker process involving much less labour for 
the settlement officer and partly because the forests were burdened with rights which were recorded” 
[Azhar (1993), p. 126]. 
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disappeared due to lack of subsequent repairs with the result that the 
demarcation lines remain only on ... map” [Azhar (1993), p. 127). On the state of 
boundaries in the Murree Kahuta forest division, Bashir (1959) writes that “in 
several forests ... boundary pillars were found missing and there was no clearly 
defined boundary line” [ibid, p. 127]. On this Muhammad (1972) later noted, 
“the reserved and protected forests were not even touched by the settlement 
officer” [Azhar (1993), p. 127]. 
As a result of this lack of effort there has been considerable illegal 
annexation of and encroachment on Guzara and state forests. According to 
Muhammed (1972) “the forest department was not adequately represented in the 
current settlement and the settlement officer has shown the encroachment in the 
reserved and protected forests as nautors30 in guzara forests” [Azhar (1993), p. 
127].  
In conclusion we can say that state control of the forests was never 
accepted by the local population, particularly in those forests where traditional 
usufructus rights had existed. This resulted in a conflictual relationship between 
the government and the locals that has persisted over the years. In the face of 
local protests, the government had no option but to leave the disputed areas out 
of the Reserve category. This led to the emergence of another category of 
forests, called Protected forests, and locals were granted more rights in those 
forests. More importantly, the disputed state of these forests was recognised and 
it was decided that the decision would be taken only after a thorough 
investigation on the legitimacy of claims had been done. 
 
Conflicts, Uncertainties, and Their Impact on Forest Management 
Gadgil and Guha (1995) consider that the most important consequence of 
the state action was the “intensification of social conflict between the state and 
its subjects. Throughout the colonial period, popular resistance to state forestry 
was remarkably sustained and widespread” [Gadgil and Guha (1995), p. 85]. 
Opposition to forest management was expressed through the violation of forest 
laws. Constituting a direct challenge to the state to relax its control over the 
forests [Guha (1993), p. 87]. 
Cernea (1988b) in an appraisal of the World Bank assisted social forestry 
project notes that the FD was in open conflict with the majority of population 
[Cernea (1988b), p. 164]. This feeling of apathy is not one way. Dove (1994) 
notes that the FD has an attitude of mistrust towards local population and 
attributes overexploitation of tree products and deforestation of forested area to 
the ‘anti-tree’ attitudes of the rural people. Up until recently, state foresters 
maintained that farmers were not merely the enemies of the forest (i.e., the state 
forests), but they were also opposed to trees per se” [Dove (1994), p. 107]. 
                                                          
30Nautors refers to breaking of guzara land for private cultivation. 
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Considerable uncertainties exist in the tenure pattern of Protected forests. 
These forests were the result of failure of government to demarcate disputed 
lands. This declaration was used as an interim device to extend legal cover to the 
disputed forests till the process of settlement can occur. The settlement process 
is meant to examine the rights and claims of locals in detail in a judicial process. 
This judicial inquiry should result in acceptance, rejection or commutation on 
suitable payment of these rights. In latter two cases, the forest can then be 
declared as Reserved. A protected forest is therefore not a category where forests 
can remain perpetually.  
Pakistan (1992) in its report on the state of forestry in NWFP admits that 
the disputed status of Protected Forests has affected its management. It writes, 
“ownership of these forests is often disputed. The ongoing disputes have 
prevented settlement in the Malakand Division and interfere with proper 
management of Protected Forests” [Pakistan (1992b), section. 1-3].31 The 
government claims that the legal title lies with the government but the locals 
make competing claims. Most studies on forestry talk of abuse of customary 
rights [Khattak (1996, 1994); Azhar (1993); Pakistan (1992a), Cernea (1990)].32  
Khattak (1994) argues that tenurial uncertainties and inequalities are a 
major cause of forest depletion. He argues “large scale deforestation in the 
Malakand Agency was caused during the seventies by tenants who considered it 
inequitable for landlords to claim major benefits from forests even when they 
were not resident in the area [Khattak (1994), p. 29]. 
Writing on the current degraded state of Hazara forests, Azhar claims that 
population pressure does not seem to be an important factor in the degradation of 
these forests. In 1870 the average household holding was 16 acres, sufficient to 
meet the household requirements. From this he concludes that it was the 
“prevailing atmosphere of antipathy towards the government and the forests 
contributed to the decline of forests”. Clearing forest lands to rid them of the 
state rights seemed logical on part of the right holders to ascertain their claims 
on these lands” [Azhar (1993), p. 120, emphasis added].  
Indeed, excessive felling of trees was triggered by tenurial problems, but 
there are other dimensions of this problem too. The case of the pilot forestry 
programme under the Azad Kashmir Hill farming Technical Development 
Project in Pakistan, co-financed by the World Bank between 1978-83 illustrates 
                                                          
31This report is a part of a comprehensive 25 year plan for the forestry sector. This plan, 
(Forestry Sector Master Plan (FSMP) 1992) was prepared with the financial and technical assistance 
of Asian Development Bank. The FSMP provides policy guidelines for the national development of 
forestry in Pakistan. 
32Pakistan (1992a), in fact, holds this abuse of rights as one of the main cause of forest 
depletion. Khattak (1996) writes “the main cause of forest depletion in NWFP is wood removal by 
local communities for meeting their domestic needs, and excessive timber removal by the vested 
interests through licit and illicit means” [Khattak (1996), p. 4]. 
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one more dimension- resistance by the local population to active management by 
the FD, namely in regeneration and plantation (afforestation). 
This project aimed at artificial regeneration by planting trees on 
communal lands. Cernea (1988b) writes, “the small farmers hesitated to accept 
project planting on their lands. They were fearful of losing possession or control 
over their land to the government once it was planted by the FD, or being 
deprived of their rights to collect fodder and graze their cattle. Most of the 
farmers interviewed indicated that they might offer small plots for project 
planting, provided they could be convinced that the FD would not alienate their 
lands and that they would be able to cut grass for their cattle” [Cernea (1988b), 
p. 170]. “In contrast, large landowners, being confident of their political power, 
did not regard tree planting by the FD as a threat to their ownership of land and 
trees” [ibid, p. 170]. 
A joint study by the Government of Pakistan and the Dutch Government 
on the Environmental profile of North West Frontier Province Pakistan 
concluded, “the management of protected forests is highly unsustainable. The 
local people contest the ownership of the forests. They do not allow the FD to 
plant areas from where mature trees are removed. And natural regeneration fails 
to get established because of ubiquitous grazing. The forests are not demarcated 
and the local people promptly appropriate any sizable opening in the forests for 
cultivation. The law and order situation in many of the forest is tenuous” [Van 
Dijk and Hussein (1994), p. 41]. 
Khattak (1994) on the situation of Protected Forests writes “the inability 
of the government to conduct settlement proceedings in the protected forests is a 
major cause of forest depletion in the Malakand Civil Division. Even though 
government claims ownership of these forests, the people do not recognise such 
ownership. Because the locals have not allowed the settlement process, it has not 
so far been possible to declare the forests as ‘Reserved’, to determine the rights 
of people in them, and to demarcate them. This scenario encourages the 
pernicious practice of illicit felling of trees to extend agricultural encroachments 
within forests. Even when trees are felled under the authority of the FD, the local 
people generally do not allow them to plant up the felled tree areas in the fear 
that such planting would reinforce the claims of the government to the 
ownership of the forests” [Khattak (1994), p. 29]. 
A related problem, to forest degradation, is the opening up of land for 
cultivation. The forestry legislation prohibits the clearing and breaking up and 
cultivation of land in such forests (Forest Act of 1927, section 33g). Khattak 
(1994) notes, “it is not possible to enforce this prohibition under the current law 
and order situation. Consequently, most forest openings which can sustain 
agriculture are usually cropped” [Khattak (1994), p. 36]. 
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Uncontrolled grazing is yet another problem contributing to the decline of 
forest by hindering regeneration. “The greatest single factor vitiating the 
effectiveness of massive efforts at regenerating forests and planting forest lands 
has been continuous uncontrolled grazing and lack of cooperation and often 
open hostility from the local people in this venture. Livestock roam free all over 
the forests...Where expensive fencing is installed, it cannot be effectively 
maintained against the will of the local communities. And even an army of forest 
guards cannot protect planted seedling from being surreptitiously uprooted by 
grazers from the areas which they consider their legitimate grazing grounds. It 
is not surprising therefore that the average survival of planted seedlings is low 
and our natural regeneration has seldom succeeded unless we were able to secure 
the prior cooperation of the local communities, for example in the German-
assisted Kaghan Intensive Forestry Project” [Khattak (1996), p. 4].  
The government confesses that the issue of rights is very important, and 
that not much has been done in regards to the issue of tree tenure in Pakistan. 
However, “rights have multiplied beyond the carrying capacity of the forests, 
these have already finished some good forests and are a threat to others. Rights 
are often misused” [Ashraf (1992a), p. viii].33 
Ashraf (1992a) in his study on the issue of tenure and legislation (as 
background study for the FSMP) writes, “The issue of rights of people on 
communal and public forest is a difficult one. Many right holders feel uncertain 
about the continuation of their rights and concessions. The reasons are a) 
repeated declaration by the government of its intention to forfeit the rights; b) 
informal and wrong seizure of parts of communal forest land by the influential 
persons; and c) over use of land and over cutting of trees by a few politically and 
socially powerful right holders in a manner that others are unable to exercise 
their rights. Being doubtful of the future, many right holders try to obtain 
maximum benefits in the present” [Ashraf (1992a), p. 44]. 
 
Enforcement Mechanism—Its Problems 
Enforcement mechanisms are required to ensure that property rules are 
observed, and to ensure protection of property from illegal seizure. As discussed 
earlier, a proper enforcement mechanism must have the following components: 
(1) a system to detect that a crime has been committed; (2) a system of penalties 
to ensure that (a) penalties are imposed; and (b) penalties outweigh benefits from 
the crime. Does such a system exist in the present case? 
In Pakistan, the enforcement mechanism basically relies upon the force of 
law. The principle legislation in this regard is the Forest Act of 1927. This act 
consolidated the law relating to forests. Forests of Hazara division, however, are 
regulated by the Hazara Forest Act 1936. 
                                                          
33 Ashraf (1992a) Background paper  FSMP 1992, Forest Policy, Tenure and Legislation.. 
 21 
As the state control of the forests was brought about under the premise of 
conservation, the legislation that ensued the forest control was designed with this 
consideration.34 The basic purpose of legislation has been to protect the forests 
from misuse and damage done by either man or animal.  
 
The Forest Act, 1927 (Act No. XVI of 1927) 
The act was promulgated to assist in carrying out the 1894 National 
Forest Policy objectives. It: 
 1. Lays down procedures for constituting and managing different kinds of 
forests like reserved and protected Forests; 
 2. Provides rules to restrict people’s action in and around public and 
community forests; 
 3. Prescribes duties of the public and the public servants in relation to 
forests; and  
 4. Chalks out penalties for violating rules. 
“Providing strong legal support to the public service for conserving and 
protecting35 public forests from human and animal damage has been the key 
objective of all forest legislation”. [Pakistan (1992a), section 4.3.2]. The 
government considers this legislative support as essential to carry out the 
objectives of a national forest policy. It is needed to prevent forest fires, control 
pests and diseases. 
“The forest legislation in Pakistan is regulatory and punitive in nature. 
Basic legislation, primarily regulatory and punitive in nature, does exist to 
prevent and punish abuse of public forests. In fact forest law has been the main 
tool in the hands of the forest service to ensure rational behaviour of people 
towards national forests. Almost exclusive reliance on the force of law has been 
the strategy to achieve the main policy objective of forest conservancy” [Ashraf 
(1992a), p. 49]. 
At present the Forest Officer is the person responsible to protect, rather 
police, the forests [Pakistan (1992a), section, 4.3.2], and these powers are vested 
in him under the Forest Act of 1927. Under section 75 of chapter XI of the 
Forest Act of 1927, “the government may invest any Forest Officer with all or 
any of the following powers, that is to say: (a) the powers to enter upon any land 
                                                          
34Khattak (1994) question the fundamental principle behind this legislation. He writes “the 
need for forestry legislation arose towards the close of the nineteenth century to stem the tide of 
deforestation which was sweeping pre-partition India in response to a high demand for timber 
created by the construction of cantonments and railways needed for the consolidation of the British 
rule. Its principal motivation was to safeguard the best forests in the imperial interest, against 
damage by the ruled” [Khattak (1994), p. 20]. 
35Law even gives some police responsibilities, including the power to arrest, to forest 
officers. 
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and to survey, demarcate and map the same; (b) the powers of civil court to 
compel the attendance of the accused and witnesses and the production of 
documents and material objects; (c) power to issue a search warrant under the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898; (d) power to hold an inquiry into the forest 
offences, and ... to receive and record evidence; and (e) power of a Magistrate to 
try forest offence cases summarily...; (f) power of a court to order ejectment of a 
person who has been convicted of an offence,36 or to remove or demolish all 
encroachments made by him” Pakistan Forest Act (1927). 
In addition, Section 82 of 1927 Act makes every person living near the 
forest responsible to help in controlling forest fires and prevention of forest 
offences. “(1) Every person who exercises any right in a reserved or protected 
forest or in any other forest land under the control of government ... shall be 
bound to furnish without unnecessary delay to the nearest Forest Officer or 
Police Officer any information he may possess respecting the commission of, or 
intention to commit, any forest offence...and shall assist any Forest Officer or 
Police Officer demanding his aid (a) in preventing the commission in such forest 
or land of any forest offence; and (b) in discovering and arresting the offender. 
(2) Any person who, being bound so to do, without lawful excuse fails.... shall be 
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or 
with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both” Pakistan Forest 
Act (1927). 
Chapter Six of the Forest Act of 1927 details out the penalties and 
procedures. According to which the government may prescribe, as penalties for 
the contravention of any rules, imprisonment of a term which may extend to six 
months, or a fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or both. Under this 
rule, any property (all tools, boats, carts, and cattle) that is suspected to be used 
in commission of a forest crime may be confiscated (Sections 52-55). 
 
The NWFP Hazara Forest Act, 1936 
This act was promulgated to accommodate the wastelands of Hazara 
division.37 It chalks out rules for the management of reserved (Chapter II) and 
guzara (Chapter III) forests in the division. Chapter VII details out penalties and 
procedures. These penalties and procedures are the same as specified in the 
Pakistan Forest Act of 1927. 
In addition to these, General Pakistan’s law applies to forests. For 
example, theft of forest produce can be dealt with under Pakistan Penal Code as 
                                                          
36Details of what constitute a crime are spelled out in section 26, clause (h) of sub-section 
(1), and in section 34. In nutshell these include clearing of land for cultivation, setting of fire, 
trespassing or grazing cattle, damage to trees, removing any forest produce, hunting, operating 
mechanical device to cut trees. Nothing in this section prohibits exercise of the rights granted to the 
local population. 
37District at that time. 
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that of any other property. In sum, the protection of forests relies on the force of 
law, with major responsibility of enforcement of law lying with the Forest 
Officer. In addition, local population is required to assist Forest Officer in any 
operation that is required in this regard. In the next section we see how this 
mechanism has worked. 
 
Forest Legislation—Its Effectiveness 
We first see how government looks at the current legislation, whether it 
considers it to be effective under current socio-economic conditions. The FSMP 
claims that the legislation has proved of great value in conserving public forests. 
The general view is that the existing legislation is adequate for the management 
of state forests. However it needs some revisions to allow for community 
participation in the management affairs. On the issue of customary rights it 
contends, “the law clearly recognises and accepts the various rights of the people 
on forests and has set definite rule for their exercise. It thus, helped in keeping 
peace and order in the village communities. Without such legal authority and 
clear cut demarcation of areas for the exercise of rights there would have been a 
chaos and the resource itself would have suffered a quick destruction” [Pakistan 
(1992a), section 4.3.2].38 
However, a review of the law and order situation reveals that this is not 
the case. The law and order situation in the Protected Forests, which constitute 
majority of the forests, is tenuous. In the previous section we talked about the 
conflictual relationship between the FD and the local population, how it has 
affected the working of the department. We also mentioned that this tension has 
caused violation of law by the locals in retaliation. Cernea (1988a) quotes the 
number of reported forest cases stands at 50,000 in the Azad Kashmir region, 
almost one family in every six being involved [Cernea (1988a), p. 140]. This 
does not take account of those crimes that go unreported. 
In fact legislation has lost much of its power. People are no more willing 
to accept any harsh legal restrictions. “Enforcement of forest laws and rules has 
become a problem” [Ashraf (1992a), p. 72, emphasis added]. 
On this Khattak writes “occasionally the people have rebelled even 
against the solitary restriction: large scale commercial felling. Because such 
instances posed serious political considerations, they were compromised in 
various ways, without the use of any legal sanctions” [Khattak (1994), p. 36]. 
Forest crimes are difficult to detect. The Law relies on the Forest Officer 
and the locals in detecting crimes. Khattak writes, “The territorial sizes are so 
large that it is impossible for the official responsible to ensure their sustainable 
                                                          
38However, it admits that it has caused annoyance to the public. “Uncompromising and 
harsh application of the Act’s provisions and rules has been the main cause of people’s antagonism 
towards FD” [Pakistan (1992a), section, 4.3.1]. 
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management” [Khattak (1994), p. 12]. Pakistan (1992a) also identifies extremely 
large territorial charges as a problem in the management of forests. This, as a 
result, makes detection of crimes difficult for them.  
The law holds local population responsible in assisting the Forest Officer 
in crime detection and prevention. They could have been of great value in this 
regard, but in a situation where the local population stands in open hostility with 
the FD, and their lack of cooperation towards the FD is a well cited and known 
phenomenon, it is highly unlikely that they will extend any kind of cooperation 
in crime detection, and history has not proved otherwise. 
Forest Crime Penalties 
Chapter six of the Forest Act of 1927 prescribes penalties for the 
contravention of any rule. According to it the government may prescribe, as 
penalties for the contravention of any rules, imprisonment of a term which may 
extend to six months, or a fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or both. 
Under this rule, any property (all tools, boats, carts, and cattle) that is suspected 
to be used in commission of a forest crime may be confiscated [Pakistan Forest 
Act (1927), sections 52-55]. 
“The punishment provided for forest offences remain unchanged since the 
first version of the Indian Forest Act was promulgated in 1865, while the 
profitability of illicit trade in timber has increased 500 times. Considering the 
difficulties in the way of proving guilt in forest offences, and the low punishment 
provided in the forest laws, they no longer act as effective deterrents to the 
commission of forest offences” [Khattak (1994), p. 21]. 
Writing on the enforcement of forestry legislation Ashraf (1992a) 
concludes, “the effectiveness of forest law is further undermined by the two 
other factors. First, forest law matters are held in comparatively low esteem by 
the magistracy and other law enforcing agencies. As a result forest cases are 
given low priority and kept pending and undecided for long. Huge files of 
pending cases have accumulated in each province giving the impression to the 
offenders that nothing was going to happen to them. Second, some forest 
personnel invested with authority to book arrest and compound the forest cases 
misuse these powers. It invites public contempt of the law and instigates them to 
violate the law in protest, often without punishment” [Ashraf (1992a), p. 72]. 
Pakistan (1992a) observes that many forestry laws have lost their purpose 
and usefulness. Some others clash with non-forestry legislation, like laws on 
mines and minerals; and corporate laws on regional development. This causes 
local and inter-departmental conflicts [Pakistan (1992a), section 4.3.3]. 
Khattak (1994) brings out an important point that the legislation says 
nothing about the obligations of the government, and provides no mechanism for 
remedial action when forest depletion is the result of its own action [Khattak 
(1994), p. 21]. 
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From the above discussion, we can conclude that enforcement of forestry 
legislation has not been effective and as such has not ensured an orderly 
behaviour of the human population towards these forests. 
 
Management System 
Crucial for the conservation is a proper management system, which 
should ensure a continuous flow of services from the resource without harming 
it. In Pakistan, natural hill forests serve two important functions; (1) protect the 
watersheds; and (2) are a prime source of timber. Therefore, the management 
system should be such as to ensure that these forests continue to perform these 
two vital functions. Indeed, according to the documents of the FD, such system 
has been developed, presumably practiced as well. These forests are managed 
under a system of sustained yield principle, based on a selection system. 
Theoretically, Sustained yield principle ensures that only the annual yield is 
taken from the forests, without harming the stock which as a result is kept intact. 
Selection system evolved out of necessity as a permanent cover had to be kept on 
the steep slopes. From here we can conclude that the system that was developed 
does indeed suit the objectives. Let us see how thing are done in reality.  
In the current organisational set up FD marks trees to be felled, the 
harvesting, transportation and sale is the responsibility of an autonomous 
government organisation, FDC (Forest Development corporation).39 The FDC 
works in the reserved and protected forests.40 Before 1973, FD used to sell standing 
volume of trees to private contractors, who were then responsible for felling and 
transporting the timber to the sale depots. Since these contractors were the owners 
of trees once these were sold out to them, they had an interest in felling much more 
than that permitted on a sustainable yield basis. The practice got defamed and was 
eventually stopped. A Forest Development Corporation was then created in the 
province of NWFP for harvesting, transportation and sale of timber. It tenders out 
the service of felling and transportation to the private contractor. This practice 
differed from the earlier practice in the way that under this new arrangement the 
contractor does not become the owner of the trees at any moment in time. 
Therefore it was assumed that he would have no incentive to fell more tree than 
those marked. An assumption that soon proved to be wrong. 
This arrangement was adopted to counter the practice of over felling. 
Indeed, the GOP is satisfied that the FDC has put an end to over felling and 
“these arrangements have effectively removed corruption that was common 
under the previous system of stumpage sale to contractors [Pakistan (1992a), 
section 4.4.4,).” Other authors do not seem to be in agreement [See Khattak 
(1996, 1994); Khan and Zurflueh (1994)]. 
                                                          
39The FDC operates only in the Province of NWFP. 
40In the protected forests local people are entitled to a 60 percent share in the sale proceeds. 
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A report by the Kalam Integrated Development Project (KIDP) identifies 
‘the alleged collusion’ between foresters and contractors, a legacy of British 
administration,41 still exists in the NWFP forestry department. “Especially 
poignant is ...(the) observation on the ‘alleged collusion’ between foresters and 
contractors. The government of NWFP took action against this in 1973, and 
disallowed the sale of standing trees to contractors or forest lessees. Later, in 
1977, the FDC was created to act in the place of contractors. The overall 
situation, however, is said to have changed for the worse through the complex 
series of developments” [Khan and Zurflueh (1994), p. 2]. 
The report describes the series of events as follows. In 1981, the FDC 
adopted a system of pre-fixed rates for the payment of royalty. Under this 
system, the concessionists were paid royalty according to the pre-determined 
rates42 that were agreed upon by all the parties. The system functioned well until 
the late 1980s, because FDC contracted out harvesting and transportation to 
labour contractors, who had no vested interest in over felling. The labour 
contractors made profits purely by working efficiently. The surplus revenue 
accrued to the government. 
In the late 1980s, when timber prices rose dramatically, and the labour 
wages followed suit, a system of net sale was adopted. Under this system FDC 
deducts the actual harvesting cost plus taxes from the sale proceeds after 
auction, the remainder was split between the concessionists (60 percent), and 
the government (40 percent). This allowed more revenue to accrue to 
concessionists. 
“Contractors and (ex) forest lessees were quick to take advantage. Royalty 
purchasers entered as de facto contractors largely through the ignorance of 
illiterate majority of concessionists. This was easy. The new net sale was poorly 
understood by rural concessionists, and the purchasers guaranteed a fixed rate 
for standing volume of timber... Rather than to face the uncertainties of a 
perceived fluctuating market and uncertain tenure, concessionists opted for a 
fixed (low) rate. Royalties were purchased through influencing tribal elders, who 
entered into legal agreements on behalf of the tribe. Purchasers then registered 
their or relatives name as contractors with the FDC, and manipulated, the 
bidding to win the contract (emphasis added), at rates that no contractors not 
backed by a royalty purchase could compete with. Thus, they entered the same 
harvesting coupes as contractors that they had purchased.” [Khan and Zurflueh 
(1994), pp. 2-3]. 
                                                          
41Tucker (1982) identified the malpractice in the forestry administration in the colonial 
regime. He reports of private contractors and forester collusion in timber theft, and how “senior 
officials of FD were never able to effectively monitor their chronically underpaid subordinates” 
[Tucker (1982);  Khan and Zurflueh (1994)]. 
42Implied rate per tree removed. 
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They now have enormous interest in over felling, thus realising huge 
profits. The practice still continues. Although the FDC was established to 
eliminate the malpractice of forest contractors, it came to depend upon the same 
contractors. Thus, the same situation of a close relationship between the FDC 
and contractors came to prevail [ibid, p. 5]. 
In a report on the environmental profile of the NWFP region (a joint study 
by the GOP and the Dutch government) also identified the current practice “The 
forest operation contractors engaged by the FDC for felling and transportation, 
have purchased the 60 percent share of the people in the sale proceeds, by 
making advance payments to them, and have therefore regained an interest in 
illicit felling thereby undermining the raison-de-ere for the establishment of the 
corporation” [Van Dijk and Hussein (1994), p. 41]. It further writes “The forest 
department gives high priority to forest conservation, but despite all efforts, the 
tremendous pressure on forests caused by high prices of timber and the demand 
for fuelwood and money makes it extremely difficult to save the forest. It is 
generally perceived that Forest Department Staff is also a threat to the forest”  
[ibid, p. 41]. 
Even if all was going well with the harvesting operations, the yield 
prescriptions in some instances have been too high, endangering the survival of 
forests. A GTZ (1990) study of Siran and Agror Tanawal Forest Divisions noted 
that the prescribed yield in some of the working plans are far beyond the 
sustainable level and would ultimately cause the demise of the forests. Apart 
from an annual off take which is higher than the annual growth of the forests, 
regeneration is visibly absent over most forests [Khattak (1994), p. 10]. 
 
Political Influences 
Political factors are said to have affected the working of the FD, and have 
interfered with the management practices. Various studies have talked about the 
use of political power to further the interest. “Powerful political elements are 
involved in forestry. Forests have also been frequently used for political 
patronage. With increasing political uncertainty, FD has been highly politicised” 
[Khattak (1994), p. 12], with serious repercussions on its functioning. 
Cernea (1990) talks about the use of political power by big land owners in 
the Azad Kashmir Hill Farming Project, namely to have their lands reforested at 
the expense of the government, whereas the project was suppose to benefit the 
small land owners. He also mentions how this power has been used to encroach 
communal lands and incorporate them in private property. Khattak (1994) notes 
that “the dangerous trend of changing working plan prescription to suite 
influential political parties still continues” [Khattak (1994), p. 21]. 
Felling schedules are often changed through the use of political influence 
to suit the interest of private contractors. They find out which forests are due for 
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felling and then approach the locals who are 60 percent owner of the revenues, to 
buy their shares [Khattak (1994), p. 27]. 
 
Accountability 
In the theoretical chapter it was argued that under state management, the 
state apparatus functions as the custodian of the interest of the public at large, 
and should discharge its functions accordingly. As such they should be held 
accountable to the public for their actions. This necessitates a system of 
accountability.  
Does such a system exist in the present set up of forest management in 
Pakistan? Unfortunately not! The present body of legislation details out prohibited 
actions, and penalties in case of violation, to safeguard the forests from the misuse 
by the ‘public’ but is silent on what ought to be done if the harm is done by the 
forest officials themselves. Khattak (1994) points out the lack of accountability in 
the current procedures, he notes that the law “says nothing about the obligations of 
the government; and provide no mechanism for remedial actions when forest 
depletion is the result of its own action” [Khattak (1994), p. 21].  
Pakistan (1992a), on the issue of forestry legislation and its weaknesses 
writes “All forestry laws have been made for administrative rather than for 
technical management of forests. No law provide for legal safeguards against 
over-exploitation of forests” [Pakistan (1992a), section 4.3.2]. The Modal Forest 
Law, which is merely an extension of 1927 Act, does not come up with any 
solution and does not contain any clause on the issue of accountability. Ironically 
the only clause, section 77 of Chapter XI,43 that is contained on the conduct of 
Forest Officers reads, “No suit shall lie against any public servant for anything 
done by him in good faith under this act”[Pakistan (1992a), appendix 1]. 
This is despite the fact that the government has admitted, in its own 
publications, the presence of corruption in forest management as a problem.  “In 
general, the personnel are mismanaged due to excessive political interference in 
the institutional and administrative matters. Service morale is low, it also suffers 
from all the ills of professional ethics for which the bureaucracies of developing 
countries are known for” [Ashraf (1992b), p. 4]. 
 
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS  
In winding up the discussion we make note of the weaknesses that our 
analysis has identified. Our first observation is on the issue of ownership. We 
noted that conflicts over ownership emerged when the state tried to impose its 
control over the forests. The act itself, and the process afterwards, resulted in a 
                                                          
43This chapter deals with the duties and powers of the Forest Officers. According to section 
76, all Forest Officers are considered public servants. 
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situation where locals were in open conflict with the government, an uncertain 
tenure situation emerged from this process in the Protected Forests category.  
On the issue of enforcement we noticed many gaps in the present system. 
Our first observation was about the lack of interest and efforts by the government 
in the initial enforcement of its control, particularly visible in the task of 
demarcation of the forests. Secondly, the present enforcement system, which is 
designed to protect forests from harm done by either man or his animal, is a far 
cry from a well functioning system. We concluded that it is very close to being 
non-functional, and hence ineffective.  
The analysis of the management system identified significant 
malpractices; corruption and political interferences were mentioned in this 
regard. Particularly, there is no system to hold the forest officials answerable to 
the public, with the result that the officials follow their own interests, to the utter 
neglect of the ‘collective interest’. 
As a consequence of all these gaps in the institutional arrangement, the 
behavioural patterns that have evolved over time, and have come to prevail 
treat forests as ‘no-man’s land’. On part of the locals, their initial resentment 
of the act that alienated them from ‘their’ resource, and the ensuing 
uncertainty about the continuation of whatever rights they were left with, the 
overexploitation of the resource by the government itself for its commercial 
purposes, and more importantly, the lack of any proper enforcement 
mechanism, all combined and worked to shape their behaviour such that they 
consider it justified to extract their share from the resource; hence becoming 
part in the deforestation process. 
For the other two actors, namely the forest officials and the contractors, 
on account of forests not being their property, it is obvious that they will have 
little interest in the conservation of the resource. Unless they are forced to do so 
by being held responsible and answerable to the public. In the absence of any 
such threat of being questioned for their activities, their ‘rational motives’ forced 
them to overexploit the forests.  
Unfortunately, the set up, which should have provided an atmosphere that 
is conducive for the conservation of forests, worked opposite. There is no reason 
to believe that these actors will change their attitude towards forests if the 
existing arrangement continues to prevail. If government is serious about 
conserving the forests, a change in the institutional set up is needed. We quote 
Bromley and Cernea (1989) on the efficacy of state regime, “most state property 
regimes are examples of the state’s ‘reach exceeding its grasp’. Many states have 
taken on far more resource management authority than they can be expected to 
carry out effectively. More critically, it sets the government against the peasant 
when, in fact, successful resource management requires the opposite” [Bromley 
and Cernea (1989), p. 25]. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE FOREST MANAGEMENT 
The first suggestion concerns the ownership issue. The government must 
take steps to resolve this issue. The way out of this dilemma is to recognise the 
rights of the locals, and hence create a vested interest of the community in the 
protection and conservation of forests. We can gain insight from the case of 
Chaprote forest,44 where a village committee, in recognition of their traditional 
rights, was first merely involved in the management of forest and later on given 
complete charge of the forest. Mumtaz and Nayab (1992) report that the 
committee was successful in putting a check on the deforestation process. 
Second point deals with the involvement of the community in the 
management affairs. The government considers public participation to be an 
important item on its agenda.45 But it limits the role of local population to 
plantation activities. If government is serious about harnessing the human 
resources of the area, then the participation should go beyond what is prescribed 
in the plan. More specifically, locals should be involved, rather made responsible 
for establishing an effective monitoring system.46 As Seabright (1993) writes, 
locals may not have superior monitoring abilities vis-à-vis the state—the latter 
may be able to call up more sophisticated monitoring technologies—but they 
have more interest in the protection of the resource. This point is further 
strengthened by the fact that the sector is facing a financial crunch, and above 
that human resource problem as indicated in the plan. The government is not in a 
position to incur huge costs on reinforcing its monitoring system. 
The third point relates to accountability. Forest officials should be made 
accountable and answerable to the public. An interesting example of this comes 
from the Kalam Integrated Development Project (KIDP). The KIDP supported 
working plan for the Bahrain area makes it compulsory for the FD to explain its 
silviculture rationale and marking system to the village community before it 
commences its operation. Moreover, changes have to be made in the legislation 
to make officials accountable to the general public. 
The state of affairs that emerges out of these suggestions can best be 
described as ‘collective management’.47 Collective management has been used to 
                                                          
44Chaprote forest is situated in the Nagar Valley of the Gilgit district in the Northern Areas. 
See Mumtaz,  et al. (1993) and Mumtaz and Nayab (1992, 1991). 
45See Forestry Sector Master Plan (1992). 
46See Poffenberger (1995) for a successful experience with forest protection committees, 
formed of local tribal population, in the Jungle Mahals of West Bengal. He writes that the 
emergence of these committees is grounded in tribal resistance movements against state control. A 
situation closer to what exists in Pakistan. 
47Other term used to denote this practice is co management. McCay and Acheson (1987) 
write that it signifies the political claim of local communities to the right to share management 
power and responsibility with the state. “It is an attempt to formalize a de facto situation to mutual 
dependence and interaction in resource management [McCay and Acheson (1987), pp. 31-32]. 
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identify a great variety of institutional set up including different combinations on 
the scale from self-management to state management [Sagdahl (1992),  
Benjaminsen (1995), pp. 11-12]. However, It is usually taken to mean shared 
responsibility of management among different parties.48 Ideally, the nature of the 
responsibility is decided according to the comparative advantage of the party. It 
is obvious that the sustainability of such a collective management system 
requires, as a prerequisite, the presence of a local level institution49—a 
suggestion much voiced by the academia! And definitely worth attention in the 
present case as well! 
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ABSTRACT 
This study analyses the institutional set-up of forest management in 
Pakistan, focusing on the North West Frontier Province, which houses 40 
percent of the total forestlands. These areas have faced significant deforestation 
in the past. It is feared that if nothing is done to check this process, these forests 
will soon disappear. The study argues for the Property Rights School of thought 
that the roots of environmental problems are to be traced to inadequate and ill-
defined property institutions. The study develops a normative criterion, describing 
the conditions that are essential for optimal utilisation and conservation of a 
resource, to be used in assessing the present situation. The analysis indicates that 
there are problems in the ownership structure, in the enforcement of property 
rules, as well as in the management system. It is concluded that the present 
institutional set-up is inappropriate to achieve the objective of forest 
conservation, and changes in this set-up are suggested. The study puts forward 
‘collective management’ as an alternative institutional set-up. 
  
 
